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DEVELOPMENTS IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW: 2005-2006
Barbara McDowell*
The decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the area of
residential landlord-tenant law disproportionately involve individuals living in
poverty. As an initial matter, people who rent their homes tend to be less affluent
than people who own their homes.' It is typically the poorest tenants who fall so
far behind in their rent that they are sued for eviction. In many cases, they have
no money in reserve in the event of the loss of a job, the break-up of a marriage,
or a family medical crisis. In some cases, they have no means other than withholding rent to induce the landlord to repair substandard housing conditions.
But lack of income is often not the only significant life challenge faced by the
tenants who are sued in landlord-tenant court. As legal services lawyers who
practice in this area have observed, many such tenants must also cope with physical or mental disabilities, limited education, or limited English-language proficiency. Those challenges may affect not only a tenant's ability to earn the rent
money but also a tenant's ability to understand and comply with the terms of a
lease. Another challenge facing many such tenants is the criminal activity that
afflicts much low-income housing; if the tenant's household members or guests
are drawn into drug dealing or other criminal activity, the tenant may be at risk of
losing his or her home, even if he or she was unaware of the activity or unable to
prevent it.
Several of the Court of Appeals' recent decisions involve tenants who were
facing these sorts of multiple challenges.
I.

A

TENANT'S RIGHT TO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:

DOUGLAS V. KRIEGSFELD CORP.

In Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp.,2 the en banc Court of Appeals provided important clarification of a landlord's obligation under the federal Fair Housing
Act 3 to accommodate a tenant with a physical or mental disability. The decision
has particular relevance for tenants who are alleged to have committed lease violations that may be traceable to a mental illness.
* B.A., George Washington University; J.D., Yale Law School; Director, Appellate Advocacy
Project, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia. The views expressed in this article are not
necessarily those of the author's organization.
1 Margery Austin Turner et al., for the Fannie Mae Foundation, Housing in the Nation's Capital
2005, at 37 (2005) (based on statistics from the District of Columbia).
2 884 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 2005) (en banc). The author was principal counsel for the appellant
tenant in the en banc proceedings in this case.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2007).
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Among other activities, the Fair Housing Act prohibits a landlord from discriminating in the rental or sale of housing "because of a handicap" of the renter
or buyer.4 The Act defines "discrimination" to include a landlord's "refusal to

make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a person with a disability]
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 5 Applying the Act's "reasonable
accommodation" mandate, courts have recognized that a landlord must allow a
blind or deaf tenant to have a service dog, notwithstanding the building's general
"no pets" policy,6 and the landlord must make an exception for a tenant with a

mobility7 impairment to its "first come-first served" policy for allocating parking
spaces.

The Douglas case involved a low-income tenant with disabilities of the sort
that receive less public acceptance - namely, mental illness, which manifested
itself in hoarding behavior, exacerbated by alcoholism. Asserting that Ms. Douglas's apartment was "filthy" and cluttered with "trash and debris," the landlord
served her with a 30-day notice to cure or quit, purportedly based on her violation of a lease requirement that the apartment be maintained "in a clean and
sanitary condition.",8 Subsequently, the landlord sued Ms. Douglas for possession
9
of the apartment, alleging that she had not corrected the lease violation.
With the assistance of counsel from the Neighborhood Legal Services Pro-

gram, Ms. Douglas responded by asking the landlord for a reasonable accommodation for her mental illness, which would have involved a deferral of any

eviction proceedings pending some sort of intervention by the District of Columbia government.1 ° It was clarified later in the trial court proceedings that the
accommodation would have involved a government agency's arranging for assistance to clean Ms. Douglas's apartment and keep it clean.1 1 In addition, Ms.
Douglas, through counsel, filed an answer to the landlord's complaint, which in4 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
5 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
6 See, e.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995).
7 See, e.g., Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1996); Shapiro v. Cadman
Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
8 Complaint, Attachment 1, Kriegsfeld Corp. v. Douglas, L&T No. 50733-01 (D.C. Super. Ct.)
(included in Record of Appeal in Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., No. 02-CV-711, at 13-19); Douglas,884
A.2d at 1115. Such a notice is a necessary prerequisite under District of Columbia law to a suit to evict
a tenant for violating the terms of her lease. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3505.01(b) (2001) ("A housing
provider may recover possession of a rental unit where the tenant is violating an obligation of tenancy
and fails to correct the violation within 30 days after receiving from the housing provider a notice to
correct the violation or vacate.").
9 Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1115.
10 Id.
11

Id. at 1117.

DEVELOPMENTS IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW: 2005-2006

had violated the Fair Housing Act by not
cluded the defense that the landlord
12
accommodating her disability.
The landlord essentially ignored Ms. Douglas's request for accommodation,
and the case proceeded toward trial in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the
Superior Court. The trial court rejected Ms. Douglas's Fair Housing Act defense
on multiple grounds: that the accommodation request was too vague because it
did not specifically identify the accommodation being sought; that the request
came too late, having been made after the 30-day cure period had expired and
the eviction suit had been filed; that the landlord was not required under the Fair
Housing Act to accommodate Ms. Douglas because the uncleanliness of her
apartment posed a threat to others; and that Ms. Douglas had not adequately
proved that she had a mental disability because her counsel did not present ex13
pert testimony to establish her psychiatric diagnosis.
Ms. Douglas appealed. After a panel ruled in her favor, 14 over a spirited dissent, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc. 15 The full Court ultimately
reversed the trial court by a 5-4 vote. 16 Although the members of the Court were
sharply divided as to whether Ms. Douglas was entitled to relief on the particular
facts of her case, there was considerable consensus as to the standards that should
govern tenants' reasonable accommodation defense under the Fair Housing
17
Act.
First, the Court did not even question that, in a landlord's suit for possession
based on the tenant's alleged lease violation, the tenant may defend on the
ground that the landlord failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her
disability that could have enabled her to comply with the lease. In other words, a
tenant with a disability may invoke the protections of the Fair Housing Act (and
similar statutes) not only as a sword in a suit against the landlord for monetary or
injunctive relief, but also as a shield in a suit brought by the landlord to recover
18
possession of the dwelling.
12 Id. The answer also alleged that such conduct violated the analogous "reasonable accommodation" provision of the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.21
(2001). The appeal was litigated based only on the Fair Housing Act. See Douglas, 884 A.2d 1115 n.1.
13 Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1119.
14 Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 849 A.2d 951 (D.C. 2004).
15 Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 855 A.2d 1126 (D.C. 2004).
16 Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 2005) (subject case).
17 Id.
18 Two years before Douglas, the Court explicitly recognized that a tenant may assert, as a
defense to an eviction suit, that the landlord is violating the tenant's civil rights. Barton v. District of
Columbia, 817 A.2d 834 (D.C. 2003). As the Court explained in Barton, notwithstanding the limited
jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Branch, "a defendant always has the right to present any legal
defense as part of a general denial of liability," including a defense that the eviction suit is motivated
by an improper purpose, such as racial animus. Id. at 841 (quoting Shin v. Portals Confederation
Corp., 723 A.2d 615, 618-19 (D.C. 1999)).
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Second, the Court ruled that, in order for tenants to prove a mental illness
sufficient to constitute a disability under the Fair Housing Act, they do not necessarily have to present the testimony of an expert, such as a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist, who could testify to their "specific diagnosis."' 19 Here, the Court
held that the tenant could adequately establish a disabling mental illness with the
testimony of social workers employed by the District government, both of whom
had training in mental health, had dealt with the tenant, and had formed an opinion that she was impaired by mental illness and alcoholism.2 0 The majority also
suggested that an individual's receipt of disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program may be sufficient, in itself, to establish a disability
for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. 2 1 The Court's ruling is important with respect to how disability may be proved in the fair housing context and elsewhere
because poor people often do not have a regular physician who can testify about
their precise psychiatric diagnosis. Further, obtaining an outside diagnostic expert
could be prohibitively expensive for such tenants.
Third, the Court ruled that tenants may request a reasonable accommodation
of their disability at any time before a judgment of possession is entered against
them.2 2 It was not necessary, as the trial judge suggested, for a tenant to make the
request within the 30-day period following issuance of a notice to cure or quit the time within which tenants ordinarily must take corrective action in order to
avoid eviction. This aspect of the Court's decision is important because tenants
often do not know about their right to accommodation until they are sued and
receive legal advice.
Fourth, with respect to the degree of specificity required in a tenant's request
for accommodation, the Court ruled that a "tenant's failure to make clear in her
initial request what type of accommodation she is requesting is not fatal."'23 Once
the tenant has made even a generally phrased request, the landlord has the obligation "to 'open a dialogue' with the tenant, eliciting more information as
needed, to determine what specifics the tenant has in mind and whether such
accommodation would, in fact, be reasonable under the circumstances. ' 24 This
aspect of the Court's ruling is important because many tenants may have diffi19 See Douglas,884 A.2d at 1130-33; see also id. at 1145 n.1 (Schwelb, J., dissenting) (expressing
general agreement with that ruling); id. at 1160 (Glickman, J., dissenting) (same).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1129 (noting that the tenant had not pressed that ground for finding disability in the
trial court).
22 See id. at 1124-25; see also id. at 1160 (Glickman, J., dissenting) (expressing agreement with
that ruling).
23 Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id. The dissent would not necessarily have required the tenant to spell out all aspects of the
proposed accommodation in her initial request. The dissent did, however, take the position that the
tenant's general suggestion that the case be stayed while she sought assistance from the District
government was inadequate.; in the dissent's view, the tenant should have been required to state with
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culty in fully articulating their accommodation request, whether because of the
disability for which they are seeking accommodation or because of other factors,
such as limited facility with the English language. In some cases, the landlord may
be in a more informed position than the tenant to recognize how a disability may
be accommodated. For example, if a tenant has been the subject of noise com-

plaints associated with his disability, the landlord may be able to offer accommodations such as soundproofing or moving the tenant to a comparable, but more
isolated, unit.
Finally, the Court held that the Fair Housing Act's "direct threat" exception,
under which a landlord need not make a dwelling available "to an individual
whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals," 5 applies only when the tenant would remain a threat even after the
proposed accommodation. 2 6 Thus, the possibility that Ms. Douglas's unsanitary

apartment might have been a health or safety threat before the proposed accommodation was not dispositive, as the trial court had assumed. This aspect of the
opinion is important in that it ensures a tenant's right to a reasonable accommodation is a meaningful one; otherwise, landlords would be free to exclude individuals who could, with a reasonable accommodation, live in the housing of their
choice at no risk to others.
Legal services lawyers who practice in the Landlord and Tenant Branch report
that the Douglas decision is having an impact on the ground. Landlords are increasingly amenable to discussing and attempting accommodation in cases in
which tenants' lease violations are connected with a mental or physical disability.
II.

ILLEGAL ACTIVrY AS A BASIS FOR EVICTION

Low-income families are often forced by the shortage of affordable housing to
live in neighborhoods with a high incidence of street crime, including drug dealing. z 7 Thus, there is an increased risk that family members or guests not only will
fall victim to criminal activity but also will become involved in such activity. If
these individuals do become involved in such activity, the entire family may face
eviction as a result of recently enacted federal and local laws. In 2006, the Court
of Appeals issued several decisions addressing the scope of those statutes.
more specificity at the outset what her proposal was to keep her apartment clean. See id. at 1161-63
(Glickman, J., dissenting).
25 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9).
26 See Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1125-26; see also id. at 1160 (Glickman, J., dissenting) (expressing
agreement with that ruling). The proposed accommodation entailed cleaning the apartment.
27 See, e.g., Angie Rodgers, Policy Analyst, D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute, Testimony at the Public
Hearing on the Comprehensive Housing Task Force Report of 2006, District of Columbia Council
Committee on Economic Development 4 (June 13, 2006).
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A.

The Federal "One Strike" Law: Supplanting the Local Cure Requirement

Landlords have long been able to seek the eviction of tenants who violate a
lease provision that prohibits criminal activity on the premises through state and
local law. Despite this method of recourse, in the 1990s, Congress and the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) acted to facilitate such evictions from public and federally subsidized housing. The federal
"one-strike" law requires that leases for such housing prohibit drug-related criminal activity and other "criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises" by the "tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control. ' 28 The
Supreme Court held in Department of Housing and Urban Development v.
Rucker29 that a tenant may be evicted under such a lease provision even if she
30
was not aware of the guest's or household member's criminal activity.
In Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments,31 the
Court of Appeals considered the interplay of the federal "one-strike" law and the
provision of the local Rental Housing Act that generally allows tenants to avoid
eviction by effecting a timely cure of a lease violation. 32 Since the enactment of
the "one-strike" law, tenants' advocates had argued that the local cure law 3 3 applied when the landlord sought to evict a tenant for violation of the federally
mandated lease provision, just as it would apply when a landlord sought to evict a
tenant for violation of other lease provisions. Under that analysis, a tenant could
avoid eviction by taking action within the 30-day cure period to prevent a recurrence of the problem, such as by barring the individual who engaged in criminal
activity from the premises.
In Scarborough, the tenant, who lived in a subsidized building with her six
children, was sued for eviction after a guest was convicted of having an unauthorized firearm and ammunition in the apartment. 34 The tenant was not herself
charged with any crime. She maintained that she did not know of the existence of
the gun and ammunition, and that she had excluded the guest from her home
28 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (public housing); see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (subsidized
housing); 24 C.F.R. Pt. 5, Subpt. 1. The characterization "one-strike" law derives from President Clinton's remark in his 1996 State of the Union Address that "[flrom now on, the rule for residents [of
public housing] who commit crimes and peddle drugs should be one strike and you're out." President
William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 32
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 90, 94 (Jan. 23, 1996).
29 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
30 Id.
31 890 A.2d 249 (D.C. 2006). The author was co-counsel for amici supporting the tenant in this
case.
32 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3505.01(b) (quoted at note 8, supra).
33 D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3505.01(b).
34 Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 252. The guest was also charged with second-degree murder of
another visitor to the apartment but was acquitted. Id.
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after the incident. 35 The trial court ruled, however, that the tenant was not entitled to an opportunity to cure the violation.
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the federal "one-strike" law precludes the application of the local cure law to evictions from public and subsidized housing based on a violation of the lease provision prohibiting criminal
activity by the tenant, household members, or guests.3 6 The Court acknowledged
that Congress did not express any intent to supplant local cure laws like the one
at issue in this case. The Court reasoned, however, that allowing tenants a cure
opportunity would "frustrate the purpose of an anticrime provision that permits
eviction for 'any' criminal activity" threatening other tenants' health, safety, or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises.37
The Court expressly declined to decide whether a tenant whose home is not
subject to the federal "one-strike" law - i.e., because it is not public or subsidized
housing - might be entitled to an opportunity to cure a violation of a lease provision prohibiting criminal activity. 38 That leaves for another day the question
whether there is something distinctive about a lease violation that involves a
guest's or household member's criminal activity that precludes its being cured.
B.

The District's "Drug Haven" Law: Once Is Not Enough

The District's Residential Drug Related Evictions Act (RDEA) 39 authorizes
eviction of a "tenant" or "occupant" from any rental unit that is found to constitute a "drug haven.",40 This statute, in contrast to the federal "one-strike" statute
discussed above, is thus not confined to public or subsidized housing. No right to
cure a violation of the RDEA exists. The RDEA does, however, include affirmative defenses that allow the "tenant" or "occupant" to avoid eviction if she can
prove that she was not aware of, or involved in, the drug activity in her home or
that she reported the drug activity to the police.4 1
In deciding whether the landlord has proved the existence of a drug haven, the
RDEA directs the trier of fact to consider various factors, including: "[w]hether
the rental unit has been the subject of more than one drug-related search or
seizure that has resulted in the arrest of a tenant or occupant," "[wihether a tenant or an occupant was charged with a violation of the [drug laws] due to activi35 Id. at 257.
36 Id. at 255-58.
37 Id. at 257. The Court applied the analysis of the Supreme Court's federal-state preemption
cases, while recognizing that, "[s]trictly speaking, the issue is not one of federal preemption of state
action, but whether, 'in matters of the present sort, a congressional statute [and regulations] of national application prevail[ ] over a statute applying only to the District of Columbia." Id. at 255 (quoting In re Estate of Couse, 850 A.2d 304, 305 n.1 (D.C. 2004)) (internal citation omitted).
38 Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 254-55.
39 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-3601-42-3610 (2001).
40

D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3602(a).

41

D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3604(c).
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ties that occurred within the housing accommodation that contains the rental
unit," "[w]hether a firearm has been discharged within the rental unit," and
whether there is other evidence of "the possession, manufacture, storage, distribution, use, or the attempted possession, manufacture, storage, distribution, or
use of an illegal drug by a tenant or occupant in the housing accommodation that
contains the rental unit.",4 2 A landlord need not prove all of the statutory factors
in order to prevail against a tenant.4 3
Two recent cases before the Court of Appeals considered what constitutes a
drug haven within the meaning of the RDEA. Both cases produced decisions
favorable to tenants, holding that the statute authorizes eviction only if the dwelling poses a continuing threat of drug activity. An isolated incident of drug activity
in the past is thus insufficient to authorize eviction under the RDEA.
In Crescent Properties v. Inabinet,a a the tenant initially shared the apartment
with her adult daughter, who had been seen using drugs in and around the apartment by two of the witnesses at trial. Four months before the eviction suit was
filed, however, the daughter suffered a heart attack, which left her "brain dead"
and indefinitely hospitalized. a No evidence was presented at trial that the tenant
or her guests subsequently engaged in any drug activity in or around the apartment.4 6 The trial court ruled for the tenant on the ground that the landlord failed
to show that the apartment continued to be a drug haven. 7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. In so holding,
the Court focused on statutory language indicating that "the ultimate determination under the RDEA is whether the property is a drug haven, not whether it was
a drug haven."'4 8 Within this language, the RDEA directs that a trial court must
order eviction if "the rental unit is a drug haven,"4 9 where a drug haven is defined as "a property where drugs are illegally stored, manufactured, used, or distributed." 50 The statute also enumerates the types of evidence that the court
"shall consider" in determining the existence of a drug haven, including "evidence that the drug haven... had been discontinued at the time of the filing of the
complaint or at the time of the hearing."5 1 In light of that language, the Court held

that a tenant is entitled to avoid eviction under the RDEA if the trier of fact
determines that drug activity has permanently ceased at the dwelling. 52 The
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3602(a).
Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 825 A.2d 939 (D.C. 2003).
897 A.2d 782 (D.C. 2006) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN.§ 42-3602(a)) (emphasis in Inabinet).
Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3601).
Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3602(a)(6)) (emphasis in Inabinet).
Id. at 788.

DEVELOPMENTS IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW: 2005-2006

Court cautioned, however, that a temporary cessation of drug activity may not be
sufficient, if the trier of fact determines, in light of all of the relevant evidence,
that it is likely that the dwelling will again be used for drug activity in the
future.53
In Ball v. Arthur Winn General Partnership/SouthernHills Apartments,54 the
Court of Appeals applied the statutory analysis in Inabinet to a different factual
scenario. There, the tenant had left her children in the charge of a babysitter.
While the tenant was away from home, gunfire was heard outside the apartment,
precipitating a police search. Inside the tenant's apartment, the police found the
babysitter and several other men, along with guns, drugs, and drug paraphernalia.
The landlord based its suit for eviction under the RDEA solely on evidence of
that single incident of drug activity. 55 The Court reversed a judgment for the
landlord, and remanded for a new trial, on the ground that the trial court had
operated on the erroneous premise that "a single past incident could establish a
56
drug haven."
Also in Ball, the Court of Appeals rejected the tenant's argument that, to the
extent that the RDEA authorizes eviction based on the activity of an "occupant,"
that term should be understood to refer only to a member of the tenant's household, not to guests such as the babysitter in that case.57 The Court held that the
general statutory definition of occupant as "a person authorized by the tenant or
housing provider to be on the premises of the rental unit '58 encompassed guests
as well as household members. 59 The Court suggested, without deciding, that a
tenant might have an affirmative defense to eviction if she could demonstrate
60
that she was not aware of, or involved in, the guest's unlawful activity.
The Court of Appeals' decisions in Inabinet and Ball offer tenants a measure
of protection from eviction under the RDEA if they can demonstrate that they
took swift and effective action to put a stop to drug activity in their homes. If,
however, the tenant lives in public or subsidized housing under a lease that contains the federally mandated prohibition against criminal activity, Scarborough
indicates that a single instance of such activity is sufficient for eviction, regardless
of how isolated it might have been or what measures the tenant might take to
prevent its recurrence.

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 784, 789.
905 A.2d 147 (D.C. 2006). The author was co-counsel for the tenant in this case.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 150-53.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3601(16).
Ball, 905 A.2d at 148-49, 150-53.
Id. at 152.
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Notably, in contrast to most tenants living in poverty who are sued in the
Landlord and Tenant Branch, the tenants in Douglas, Scarborough,Inabinet, and

Ball managed to obtain counsel, typically legal services counsel, to represent
them from the early stages of the case. 61 That distinction may help to explain why
theirs were among the relatively few residential landlord-tenant cases decided by
the Court of Appeals during the period covered by this article.
As of this writing, the legal services community has been encouraged by the
D.C. Council's provision of funding for the representation of low-income tenants
in the Landlord and Tenant Branch.6 2 A greater availability of counsel at the trial
level may be expected, in time, to produce a greater volume of appellate decisions - decisions that may, like those discussed above, provide important clarification of the rights and responsibilities of District tenants.

61 See D.C. Bar Public Service Activities Corporation Landlord Tenant Task Force, Final Report 5 (1998) (estimating that, as of that time, tenants were represented by counsel in only 1% of cases
in the Landlord and Tenant Branch, whereas landlords were represented by counsel in 86% of cases);
see generally Lynn E. Cunningham, Legal Needs for the Low-Income Population in Washington, D.C.,
5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 21, 61 (2000) ("The number of unmet legal needs [of District residents living in
poverty] far exceeds the capacity of attorneys currently available to handle these needs. About 10
percent of legal needs are met, and 90 percent are unmet.").
62 The budget approved by the D.C. Council for fiscal year 2007 includes $3.2 million to fund
legal services for low-income residents of the District and a loan forgiveness program for lawyers
serving those residents. See D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute, FY 2007 Final Budget Summary, About the
D.C. Budget, http://www.dcfpi.org/?page-id=132 (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).

